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As we enter the digital world, so the importance
of electronic signatures will begin to take hold
amongst lawyers, people in business, the public
services and members of the public. Millions of
people around the world use what is probably the
most popular form of electronic signature in daily
use: that of their name typed into an electronic
document, mainly in an e-mail. Another form of
electronic signature that is used frequently is the
electronic equivalent of the manuscript form of a
cross – the ‘I accept’ or ‘I agree’ icon, used on web
sites and software to indicate the signatory intends
to enter into a contract or accepts the terms of a
licence. Of interest, is that most of the people that
use these forms of electronic signature, including
those who espouse the use of digital signatures, are
not aware that they are using an electronic
signature.
Politicians have rushed into drawing up laws in
relation to electronic signatures, often in ignorance
of the concept, having been drawn into the
promises made that digital signatures can solve
issues, to the exclusion of other forms of electronic
signature that have proved to be more popular and
robust than imagined. In a desperate attempt to
indicate they are ‘digitally savvy’, politicians have
also pressed ahead with expensive and ambitious
plans to encourage or enforce individuals to use
digital signatures when corresponding with e-
government services. In the same breadth,
politicians have placed a heavy burden on those
individuals that communicate with e-government,
because the government refuses to verify the digital
signature that is used. This places an onerous
burden on the individual, because it many instances
when an individual obtains a digital signature and
uses it, it is assumed that they have either used or
authorized the use of the signature. It is no wonder
that the people of Denmark have failed to take up
the offer of obtaining a digital signature, as
described by Jan Hvarre in his article.
The use of electronic signatures poses the usual
threat to any person or organization relying on a
signature: how do you verify the signature is of the
person it purports to be and can it be trusted. The
concept of a digital signature is supposed to resolve
this conundrum, but does not. Whatever the
format an electronic signature takes, the evidential
issues will remain the same if the signature itself is
in dispute. Lawyers will have to rely on experts to
investigate the digital evidence to determine
whether an electronic signature was used. In such
circumstances, the evidential weight to be attached
to an electronic signature may well depend upon
the digital audit trails that can be adduced to
demonstrate the use of the signature. Even if an
electronic signature can be proved to have been
used, it will not follow that the person actually
caused the electronic signature to be affixed. Once
the risks attached to the use of electronic signatures
are more widely understood, it is possible that more
people might challenge the formation of contracts
in their name. This will, if such a circumstance
comes to pass, cause major problems for everybody
relying on electronic signatures to enter legally
binding contracts electronically.
This journal seeks to bring into focus the legal
and practical issues relating to electronic signatures,
in the widest sense. This includes lawyers,
academics, cryptographers, technicians and vendors
of practical solutions. Without the support of
everybody connected with electronic signatures and
the variants of signature available, there will be a
failure to more fully understand the range of
problems that need to be discussed and overcome.
This journal seeks to provide a platform to
encourage an open and honest debate on the
issues.
The editor wishes to thank the contributors of
this inaugural edition of the journal, and hopes to
see some exciting and meaningful articles and
debates in future editions.
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It is becoming increasingly common for both
commercial and public organizations to use
computers that are connected to internal and
external networks. As a result, users have begun to
alter the way they conduct business. There is
nothing new in this, as the reader will readily note.
However, the electronic environment presents a
range of problems that are little understood by end
users. Few end users of technology understand the
security issues, and even fewer numbers of people
understand the problems relating to digital
forensics. Of course, the media regularly reports on
criminal acts that are perpetrated by using a
computer and a connection to the internet, and the
proliferation of unsolicited bulk e-mail, viruses and
spyware are also reported in accordance with the
space available when a story is considered to be
worthy of reporting. However, reporting on the
problems that regularly occur will not resolve how
people interact with computers, especially when
they are connected to an external network, such as
the internet.
Of interest is the way the move towards the
electronic environment has caused a wider range of
people to become more fully aware of issues that
they would not be involved with in the normal
course of events. One example is how to store
electronic documents, images and databases that
increase in size each day. In the past, somebody in
the organization would have been responsible for
ensuring that documents were retained in
accordance with the law, regulations and best
practice. This person would also dispose of the
documents in due course, or haul them off to a
store somewhere in the blue yonder. This problem
is now affecting the IT manager and a larger
number of people in the organization than hitherto.
This is because fewer documents are filed in
cardboard folders and put into filing cabinets. They
are stored in computers.
Another issue that has yet to be more fully
understood relates to the authentication of
electronic documents – principally correspondence
sent by e-mail, although the problem is the same
for all documents transferred electronically. As
observed in the case report from Greece, and the
case note from France Société Chalets Biosson v M.
X., when people are made aware that typing their
name into an e-mail is a form of electronic
signature, their first response is to ask the question
‘Is it safe?’ The reply to this question is: ‘You have
asked the wrong question’. Nobody asks the
question ‘Is it safe?’ when presented with a
manuscript signature on a letter with the name of a
firm, company or public body printed on the paper.
Yet the entire letter may be a fabrication. The
manuscript signature and the name of the firm or
company may be forged or not even exist. The real
question to be asked of any signature (whether in
electronic format or a manuscript signature) is this:
‘Is there sufficient evidence to trust the signature?’
If not, the recipient needs to ask themselves what
action they should take to confirm the signature is
that of the person whose signature it purports to
be.
To a certain extent, many of the articles in this
issue of the Journal address this very issue. The
problem is usually considered from the point of
view of the digital signature. Where a person or
organization intends to use a digital signature, the
focus should be on the accuracy of the registration
process, and a number of articles discuss this point.
The digital signature presents a number of very
serious issues in contract and tort that are
addressed elsewhere. Considered to be an answer
to the problem of authenticating a sender, the
public key infrastructure (PKI) as it is called, does
not succeed very well. However, the use of digital
signatures can succeed within a closed PKI, such as
Identrus and, more recently, the new system
introduced under the name BACSTEL-iP, mentioned
in the News section of the Journal. This is a good
example of a semi-closed multiple PKI, where the
rights and duties of the various parties are enforced
by way of contract. This use of a PKI mechanism
illustrates what can be achieved using a PKI model.
In effect, a closed PKI system can enforce security
procedures on end users and educate them to the
practical problems at the same time.
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